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Abstract
This article makes three main contributions to the economics of happiness liter-
ature. First, using a novel data set of about 90,000 Japanese workers surveyed in
annual cross-sections between 1990 and 2004, it demonstrates that individuals expe-
rience strong disutility when they perceive that their coworkers earn relatively higher
wages. In contrast with other tests of the relative utility hypothesis in the literature,
our estimation relies on workers’ self-reported beliefs of their peers’ wages, which we
argue are more closely aligned to the “true” reference-group benchmark than the as-
sumed comparison income measures employed in other studies. Second, the article
shows important heterogeneous eﬀects of both absolute and relative income on hap-
piness. In particular, workers who are better able to accurately predict their peers’
wages seem to experience both greater utility of higher own income and greater disu-
tility of higher relative income. Third, we assess the validity of diﬀerent methodologies
that the literature has employed to construct comparison income measures and ﬁnd
signiﬁcant discrepancies, particularly when reference income is derived from Mincer
equations–a common approach in other studies. We demonstrate that such discrepan-
cies stem from the diﬃculty in ﬁnding valid exclusion restrictions that help identify the
relative income eﬀect on happiness. In the absence of self-reported reference wages,
we propose a simple IV strategy that does not eliminate the lack of consistency but
delivers a lower bound of the “true” eﬀect.
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The relative utility hypothesis (Duesenberry 1949) posits that individuals derive utility
not only from their own levels of consumption but also from how much they consume
relative to a well-deﬁned benchmark group. The empirical evidence accumulated over the
last twenty years has generally found support for this theory, extensively documenting a
negative relationship between an individual’s reported level of happiness and the income or
wages earned by his peers.1 However, there still seems to be less of a consensus about the
magnitude and economic signiﬁcance of these relative eﬀects, among other things, because
of the many approaches to deﬁne comparison income.
A common approach, for example, is to estimate a Mincer equation that allows the
econometrician to predict the wage of an individual with given characteristics. This pre-
dicted wage then becomes the relative measure to which individuals allegedly compare. An
alternative method is to calculate average wages by cells or groups deﬁned by age, gender,
education level, and other particular individual characteristics. In general, all of these ap-
proaches implicitly assume that individuals compare themselves to a hypothetical “average”
individual with given characteristics and that they infer their peers’ wages the way econo-
metricians do (Manski 1993; Sloane and Williams 2000). More speciﬁcally, each method
has potential drawbacks. For example, studies that recur to the Mincer solution must iden-
tify the reference wage eﬀect on happiness by including additional variables in the wage
regression that are excluded from the happiness equation—exclusion restrictions that are
frequently unjustiﬁed and easily refutable.
This paper makes three main contributions to the economics of happiness literature.
First, it empirically tests the relative utility hypothesis by means of a novel data set of
about 90,000 Japanese workers surveyed in repeated annual cross-sections between 1990 and
2004. The data contain information on workers’ reported perceptions of their peers’ wages,
which we argue are more closely aligned to the “true” reference-group benchmark than the
assumed comparison income measures found in the literature. Our analysis demonstrates
the existence of signiﬁcant (and negative) relative income eﬀects on reported job satisfaction
and overall happiness. These results hold even when controlling for a rich-enough list of
covariates—including workers’ own absolute income—and addressing the possibility of en-
dogenous self-reported reference wages due to underlying pessimism that could, in principle,
be correlated with individual subjective well-being measures.
Second, the article shows important heterogeneous eﬀects of both absolute and, espe-
cially, relative income on reported well-being. In particular, workers who are better able
to accurately predict their peers’ wages seem to experience both greater utility of higher
own income and greater disutility of higher relative income. We associate these results with
feelings of jealousy—as in Dupor and Liu (2003)—and with workers’ access to information
about job oﬀers and the wage structure in their profession.
Third, we assess the validity of diﬀerent methodologies that the literature has employed
to construct comparison income measures. One of the advantages of our database is that
its rich structure allows us to deﬁne reference income in ways that are similar to what
previous studies have done. We then employ three alternative deﬁnitions that are widely
1Section 2 discusses the literature in more detail.
1used in previous studies and re-estimate the model. Our ﬁndings show that, in all three
cases, the estimated relative income eﬀects are not consistent with results obtained when
self-reported reference wages are used as the comparison income measure. In one particular
case, when reference income is deﬁned using Mincer-predicted wages, the estimated absolute
and relative income eﬀects are highly unstable. We interpret this result as evidence of the
diﬃculty in ﬁnding valid exclusion restrictions that are helpful to identify the relative income
eﬀect on happiness. Next, we estimate the bias in these estimates by means of a generalized
version of the classical measurement error model and show that the direction of the bias is
ambiguous. We propose a simple instrumental-variables strategy that can be implemented
when self-reported comparison wages are not available. This approach does not eliminate
the measurement error bias, although it delivers a lower bound—in absolute value—of the
impact of reference wages on well-being.
Additionally, our paper also documents the relationship between subjective well-being
and individual characteristics of workers in Japan. Our analysis compares these results with
those in previous studies, which have focused primarily on the U.S. and the western Euro-
pean labor forces. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm several standard results in the happiness literature.
For instance, women and married workers tend to report higher levels of satisfaction than
men and single individuals, respectively. However, we also observe a U-shaped relationship
between satisfaction and educational attainment, which contrasts starkly with the mono-
tonically increasing association in the U.S. and Europe found in past studies. Given that,
to the best of our knowledge, our paper is one of the ﬁrst happiness studies in Japan, an
additional contribution to the literature is to help in the construction of a set of stylized
facts that may be generalizable to cultures outside of the West.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief synthesis of the literature
and motivates the present study. In Section 3, we present our empirical framework to test
the relative utility hypothesis, introduce our data, and explain how they diﬀer from previous
data sets on job satisfaction and happiness. Section 4 presents our main results focusing on
the use of workers’ expectations on their peers’ wages as our primary comparison income
measure. In Section 5, we re-estimate the model employing alternative metrics used in the
literature and compare the results. We also demonstrate from a theoretical standpoint why
the bias present in estimations that employ these theoretical constructs as reference income
proxies may go in either direction and propose our instrumental variables approach to bound
the reference wage estimate. Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Motivation
2.1 Literature Overview
The last twenty years have seen an increasing interest in the economics profession to in-
vestigate the relative utility hypothesis: the idea that individuals derive negative utility
when people around them obtain a higher income. In spite of a few disputes in the earlier
literature regarding the sign and signiﬁcance of this correlation, there now seems to be a
general agreement of a negative association between comparison income measures—such
as wages earned by relatives or work colleagues—and subjective well-being—for instance,
2self-reported feelings of job satisfaction or overall happiness.2 More recent studies, however,
have instead focused on providing an answer to one main question: what exactly is the
appropriate comparison income measure?
There are at least two dimensions to this question. First, what is the relevant ref-
erence group? As Clark et al. (2008) have pointed out, the bulk of the literature has
deﬁned comparison income as that earned by people with similar individual characteris-
tics. However, it is not clear what the relevant characteristics are. Reference group deﬁni-
tions vary widely among diﬀerent studies, from somewhat speciﬁc groups such as colleagues
(Cappelli and Sherer 1988; Rizzo and Zeckhauser 2003; Brown et al. 2008; Clark et al. 2009b),
friends (Senik 2009), relatives (Senik 2009), and neighbors (Luttmer 2005; Clark et al.
2009a; Knight et al. 2009; Senik 2009) to more general ones such as “someone like you”
(Clark and Oswald 1996) and “a representative person in society” (Easterlin 2001;
Stevenson and Wolfers 2008). The diﬃculty in correctly deﬁning a reference group is well
identiﬁed in Loewenstein et al. (2003) and Luttmer (2005), when they argue that compar-
ison groups are subject to change depending on the diﬀerent circumstances that give rise
to such comparisons in the ﬁrst place: “If a person buys a small house in a wealthy neigh-
borhood in part because it has a certain status value in her apartment building, she may
not fully appreciate that her frame of references may quickly become the larger houses and
bigger cars that her new neighbors have” (Loewenstein et al. 2003). Clark and Senik (2010)
ﬁnd that, when it comes to income comparisons, people most often compare themselves to
coworkers—although the distribution of answers may change depending on people’s char-
acteristics.3 For instance, individuals who are more prone to meet socially are more likely
to declare that they compare to friends, instead of colleagues. Moreover, comparisons to
friends, although less widespread, may have a greater impact on people’s utility. Nonethe-
less, the general conclusion is that what most people have in mind when they compare their
income to others, is their colleagues.
Assuming the researcher chooses the appropriate reference group, the second issue that
researchers have to deal with is, how to measure comparison income? Most of the literature
has relied on three diﬀerent methodologies, namely: (i) predicting individual wages from
Mincer equations (Clark and Oswald 1996; Sloane and Williams 2000;
L´ evy-Garboua and Montmarquette 2004; Senik 2004); (ii) calculating cell averages accord-
ing to speciﬁc individual characteristics within-sample (Ferrer-i Carbonell 2005; Akay et al.
2012), or (iii) out-of-sample from external data (Cappelli and Sherer 1988; McBride 2001;
Luttmer 2005; Clark et al. 2009a; Card et al. 2012). Consistent with several of the refer-
ence group deﬁnitions mentioned above, all of these approaches imply comparisons with
2An excellent source that documents this negative correlation and provides further detail on
the developments, validity, and applicability of happiness measures in the economics literature, see
Kahneman and Krueger (2006). A few empirical papers have shown a positive relationship between refer-
ence income and satisfaction (or happiness), which has been justiﬁed by Hirschman and Rothschild’s (1973)
“tunnel eﬀect” conjecture, whereby rising inequality may increase individual well-being if it is interpreted
as a positive signal with respect to likely future outcomes (see, for example, Senik (2004)). Nevertheless,
our reading of the literature is that the consensus correlation between these two variables is negative.
3Yamada and Sato (2010) ﬁnd that coworkers are, after friends, the second most common group against
which Japanese individuals compare. However, their sample diﬀers from ours, for example, because the
dataset we employ focus exclusively on working individuals, while theirs includes students and the unem-
ployed, who are inherently less likely to compare to work colleagues.
3other people that share some of the same features as the surveyed individual—“someone
like you,” in the Clark and Oswald (1996) sense. However, these methodologies also present
some potential problems. First, it is not clear that the individual traits that researchers
choose to construct reference income measures are necessarily the ones on which individuals
base their comparisons. For instance, why is it that Sloane and Williams (2000) use hours
worked but exclude the age of an individual to compute their reference income variable,
while Clark and Oswald (1996) do the exact opposite?4 Moreover, given the need to ﬁrst
construct a comparison income measure and then estimating a happiness equation, these
methodologies rely heavily on potentially questionable identiﬁcation assumptions. In par-
ticular, Mincer regressions from which the predicted reference income measures are derived
must include variables that are excluded from the satisfaction equation—an exclusion re-
striction that is often not warranted. Finally, all of these methods presume that individuals
compare themselves to some average, which, as discussed below, it may not necessarily be the
case. In the particular case of studies favoring the Mincer approach, estimating comparison
income by imputing peers’ wages from wage equations implicitly assumes that individu-
als will infer peers’ wages the way econometricians do (Manski 1993; Sloane and Williams
2000). This supposes a degree of sophistication that may not accurately reﬂect the mental
process an individual goes through when comparing to his peers.
This paper departs from the core of the literature by employing self-reported reference
wages as an alternative comparison income measure. The only two other relevant studies
that, to the best of our knowledge, have used direct reference income comparisons—so that
the benchmark is not chosen arbitrarily by the researcher—are by Knight et al. (2009) and
Senik (2009). The ﬁrst of these two papers exploits the results of an especially-designed
module on subjective well-being in China’s 2002 National Household Survey in order to show
that happiness depends on relative income, both when deﬁned with respect to a well-deﬁned
contemporaneous reference group and when compared to an individual’s own past income.
In particular, respondents are asked to compare their current living standard both with
the average standard in their village and with their own standard ﬁve years ago. These an-
swers are then classiﬁed in one of ﬁve possible bins that range from “much below average” to
“much above average” and then corresponding dummy variables are used in a standard OLS
regression of happiness on conventional individual characteristics and economic variables.
The results show that, under any comparison income deﬁnition, the relationship between
happiness and reference income is negative for people who consider themselves below av-
erage in any degree, while the opposite holds true for people who believe they are above
average. Analogously, Senik (2009) also provides evidence in support of the relative utility
hypothesis using the results of the Life in Transition Survey conducted in 28 post-transition
countries and Turkey in 2006. In this survey, respondents are asked to compare their current
living standard with respect to several reference groups, including their parents’, their for-
mer colleagues’, their former schoolmates’, and their past selves’ in the pre-transition period
(i.e., before 1989). Although the database does not seem to allow comparisons with poten-
tially relevant contemporaneous groups—such as current coworkers or neighbors—Senik’s
analysis concludes that “internal benchmarks” created by one’s own trajectory have the
4Table A-1 sums up how various papers that rely on diﬀerent methodologies go about constructing their
reference income measures and estimating their happiness equations.
4greatest impact on subjective well-being, followed by comparisons to former colleagues and
schoolmates. Another novel ﬁnding in Senik’s paper is that unfavorable comparisons seem
to exert a stronger eﬀect on individuals’ perceived well-being than favorable ones, a result
that the author interprets as evidence of loss aversion and a manifestation of adaptation.
Similar to the two previous studies, our approach to testing the relative utility hypothesis
also relies on a subjective measure of reference income. The data are obtained from a survey
of about 90,000 workers in Japan between 1990 and 2004, in which each respondent is asked
what he thinks is the average wage of other employees who are the same age and doing
the same job as him.5 Note that, in contrast with the ordinal nature of the comparison
income variable in Knight et al. (2009) and Senik (2009), ours is a cardinal measure, which
should facilitate the interpretation of results regarding the economic impact of comparison
income on subjective well-being. In any case, however, we believe that the use of direct
comparison income measures overcomes several of the issues that prevail in studies that rely
on researcher-based benchmarks.
2.2 Motivating the Use of Direct Comparison Income Measures
One of the evident advantages of the self-reported reference measure over the traditional
comparison income variables employed in the literature, is that individual perceptions of an
event are more closely related to the emotion that such an event may produce in a person—
and hence to any related feelings of happiness or satisfaction. To be clearer, if we believe
that there exists a negative relationship between the feelings of happiness of person i and
the income earned by other people surrounding such person, it must be because that person
somehow observes this. If individual i is ignorant about a given increase in other people’s
income, why would this produce in him any unhappiness, dissatisfaction, or any other such
feeling that relates to individual disutility?6
To illustrate this with an example, suppose that there exists a society in which there are
some very rich and some very poor people. Suppose further that, in this very unequal world,
individuals do not perceive this inequality—maybe because there is a very progressive tax
system in place, or because the rich are huge philanthropists that somehow transfer resources
to the poor, or simply because people do not care: what others earn is not part of their
utility function. In this case, there is a disconnect between actual wages and perceived
wages: actual wage disparities can be large, but people may not perceive them as such and
will therefore not be emotionally or psychologically aﬀected by them. That is, they will not
derive any utility or disutility from any ﬂuctuation in other people’s earnings.
The above example attempts to elucidate one way in which individual perceptions of
other people’s wages may be more relevant to happiness than a simple average of actual
wages of people with certain observable traits. But there are other ways in which this rela-
tionship between self-reported reference income and happiness may prove more truthful and
economically relevant than between theoretical comparison income measures and subjective
well-being. For instance, suppose now that everybody in the world earns exactly the same
5Further details on the sample, the speciﬁc questions asked, and their format are provided in Section 3.
6Card et al. (2012) in fact show that disclosing information on peers’ salaries inﬂuences workers’ job
satisfaction.
5wage, so there is zero variation in wages. Suppose also that in this ultra-egalitarian world,
there is also a great deal of misinformation, and some people think that their peers earn
more than they do, while others think that their peers earn less. This may be, for example,
because in spite of having the same actual income, people choose diﬀerent consumption
bundles, and so one person may be more frugal and save 50 percent of his income, while
another may spend this same 50 percent on a bigger house or a fancier car. In this case, even
if you know that wages do not vary across individuals, you may observe some signiﬁcant
variation in perceived wages.
Now, given that there is zero variation in wages, you should never observe any correlation
between true reference wage and happiness. However, given that perceived wages do vary—
and assuming happiness also varies across individuals—you may observe some correlation
between these two variables. Suppose that this correlation is negative (controlling for other
variables), as we observe in our data set. This negative correlation could arise for several
reasons. For instance, people may derive (lose) satisfaction from knowing/believing that
they earn more (less) than their peers. An alternative explanation, which need not overrule
the previous one, is that happy/optimistic (sad/pessimistic) people may tend to think that
they earn more (less) than others.7 Although we acknowledge the lack of good instruments
that may serve to identify the direction of causality from reference wages to happiness, we
argue, in agreement with the literature, that the main channel of this negative correlation
between these variables is the ﬁrst one. We try and rule out the alternative direction by
running a regression of happiness on perceived wages, controlling for pessimism variables,
interacting these with perceived wages, and showing that the main eﬀect still remains.
The above examples should help to justify the economic relationship between self-
reported reference wages and happiness. If we want to learn about what makes people
happy and if we want to provide policymakers with more information about what they can
do to make citizens happier, then it becomes clear that the relationship between these two
variables is worth exploring. In the previous case, where there is zero variation in wages
but people do perceive certain diﬀerences in wages that inﬂuence their happiness, perhaps
we could say that policymakers could make greater eﬀorts to inform people better.
To be fair, we should recognize that the world probably does not operate like either
of the two examples above. The point of these examples, however, is to emphasize that,
irrespective of the distribution of actual wages, what matters to people’s sense of happiness
and overall satisfaction—in the sense of Duesenberry (1949), Dupor and Liu (2003), and the
jealousy and “Keeping up with the Joneses” economics literature) is their perception of the
world. If there is a connection between such perceptions and the actual world, all the better:
in this case, we can use actual data (such as actual wages) and not individual perceptions to
determine how happy or satisﬁed people are. But this connection is not necessarily obvious,
and in this sense, we believe that a worker’s perception should be more closely aligned to
his reported level of happiness than some ad hoc comparison income measure, such as the
average wage of other workers sharing some of his individual characteristics.
Of course, our subjective reference income variable is not perfect and there are some
7Of course it could also be that this negative correlation is due to some third variable that correlates
positively (negatively) with happiness and negatively (positively) with perceived wages. We discuss these
possibilities later in the paper.
6caveats that should be kept in mind. In particular, these subjective data are obtained by
asking workers to compare themselves to other workers of the same age and doing a similar
type of job. Workers may then provide an answer that corresponds to their belief of the
wage earned by this speciﬁc reference group, but this may not correspond to the reference
group they generally compare with, say, on a daily basis, and which may have a stronger
connection with their feelings of happiness and well-being. Nonetheless, given the long
hours worked by Japanese individuals in our sample, we believe that other co-workers and
colleagues are the most natural reference group to which Japanese workers may compare.
This, in fact, is in agreement with the literature, which has consistently shown that co-
workers is one of the groups to which individuals most often compare (see, for example,
Clark and Senik 2010). Thus, although important, we believe this issue is relatively minor
and should not aﬀect our results. In the next section, we introduce the model and discuss
the data and this particular issue a bit further.
3 Empirical Framework and Data Description
In order to examine the impact of absolute and relative wages on subjective well-being,
researchers typically estimate the following regression:
(1) SWBi = α1yi + β1¯ yi + x
′
iγ + ui,
where the dependent variable SWBi represents a measure of worker i’s subjective well-being,
such as happiness or job satisfaction. This proxy for utility is assumed to depend on the
worker’s (log) wage, yi;8 a (log) reference wage that workers use as a benchmark to determine
how well they do relative to their peers, ¯ yi; and a vector of individual characteristics, xi,
that includes age, tenure, gender, educational attainment, marital status, among other
socio-demographic factors. As usual, the term ui corresponds to an idiosyncratic error
term.9
One advantage that we have over previous studies is that our dataset contains informa-
tion on workers’ actual perceptions about their peers’ wages. As discussed in Section 2, we
8Unless otherwise noted, all wages are in logs.
9This speciﬁcation can be thought of as a reduced-form version of a standard utility function of the form:
U = U(c,¯ c,h),
where c is individual consumption, ¯ c is the level of consumption of a comparison group, and h is hours
worked. The theoretical literature has investigated how much keeping-up-with-the-Joneses ultimately mat-
ters to consumers and what role social status plays in determining individual utility levels. These studies ﬁnd
that, in addition to their own levels of consumption, individuals care about their peers’ consumption levels
and their wealth rank relative to their comparison group, which validates the use of reduced-form models
such as equation 1. For instance, see Cole et al. (1992); Corneo and Jeanne (1997); and Yamada (2008).
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and Oswald (1983) theoretically analyze tax policy implications of relative
utility, while Abel (1990); Bakshi and Chen (1996); Gal´ ı (1994); and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) exam-
ined such relative eﬀects on asset pricing. Frank (1985) and Frank (2005) show that relative concerns are
more important for positional goods consumption than other goods such as leisure, and that the structure
of utility functions with relative concerns over diﬀerent types of goods is of key importance in the valuations
of social welfare.
7believe that these self-reported reference wages are more closely aligned to the true bench-
mark that workers use to compare themselves against their peers. We can thus estimate
equation 1 by standard methods10 and obtain a more precise measurement of the eﬀect of
relative wages on subjective well-being.11 We present these ﬁndings in Section 4. Our data
also allow us to compare our results to the ones we would have obtained had we followed
the alternative methodologies that Manski (1993), Sloane and Williams (2000), and others
have deemed potentially ﬂawed. These ﬁndings are reported in Section 5.
3.1 Data Description
Our dataset comes from the Comprehensive Survey of Labor Union Members, which was
designed and administered by a group of psychologists at the International Economy and
Work Research Institute. It comprises repeated cross-sections on about 90,000 union mem-
bers working in Japanese ﬁrms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1990 to
2004. The survey requests that respondents provide self-assessments on their individual
well-being at work and in life in general. In addition to this, other questions attempt to
obtain information on workers’ perceptions of their work environment.12 The dataset also
allows us to control for individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, which
include age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, annual wage level, overtime
hours worked, and workers’ expectations of their peers’ wages.
After cleaning the data and removing some inconsistencies, we are left with 78,136
observations.13 Table 1 shows some statistics that describe our dataset. Workers in our
sample are young with an average age of 35 years. Their average tenure is 14 years, which
suggests relatively low mobility in the Japanese labor force. Moreover, union workers in
Japan seem to be well-educated in general, as almost all of them have graduated from high
school, close to 50 percent have some college experience, and 36 percent have completed at
least a university-level degree. We also observe that 58 percent of workers are married and
work an average of 23 hours of overtime per month. All of these individuals are regular full-
time employees and union members. About one-third of them holds blue-collar positions and
10Given the discrete, hierarchical nature of the dependent variable, the vast majority of happiness studies
in economics have estimated equations similar to 1 using ordered logit or probit estimators. However, it is
not clear that these methods are superior to ordinary least-squares since additional assumptions required
for these estimates to be valid—such as that of parallel slopes—are often not met. Further, Luttmer (2005)
showed that results from happiness equations obtained by OLS are virtually indistinguishable from those
obtained by ordered models. Our OLS estimates in Section 4 facilitate the interpretation of the coeﬃcients,
although ordered probit estimates are also reported in the robustness section for completeness.
11This of course requires that the typical exogeneity assumptions hold. Our robustness tests in Section 4
address the possibility that wages are endogenous.
12The full list of question categories is available in an earlier version of this paper; see Appendix 1 in
de la Garza et al. (2008)
13The reduction in the number of observations is mainly due to missing information for some of the
variables used in the empirical analysis. Observations that showed inconsistencies in the data, such as the
worker’stenure being greater than his age, were also dropped from the sample. To ensure that these problems
were not due to sample selection on observable characteristics, we compared the full-sample and the working
databases along diﬀerent dimensions including age, education, wages, and reported levels of happiness and
job satisfaction. We are happy to report that we were unable to ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two datasets.
8close to one-ﬁfth of them performs some managerial role in the company. These numbers
do not intend to provide an accurate depiction of the representative Japanese worker since,
as described above, the survey was administered exclusively to union members employed
by major publicly-traded companies. Thus, the results below may not be generalizable to
the entire Japanese labor force—for instance, our dataset does not cover employees in high
administrative positions as they are not allowed to take part in unions. Nonetheless, due
to the large size of our sample and the breadth of coverage of 62 ﬁrms across a variety
of industries from food to electronics to ﬁnance, we believe that this dataset does capture
signiﬁcant features of the Japanese labor market.
One additional consideration is that our database underrepresents women in the Japanese
labor force. According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, women repre-
sent about 40 percent of the country’s working population; in contrast, the share of female
participation in our working sample is only 22 percent. This is an important issue because
male and female workers diﬀer signiﬁcantly along several dimensions. Table 1 shows some of
these gender diﬀerences in terms of observable characteristics, such as education and marital
status. For instance, while 40 percent of the male subsample obtained a college degree, only
20 percent of the female group achieved this goal. Interestingly, the fraction of married men
is twice the proportion of married women (66 percent vs. 33 percent). Since the literature
has found signiﬁcant correlations between various subjective well-being measures and indi-
vidual characteristics such as gender, educational attainment, and marital status, pooling
the male and female subsamples in our analysis may lead to results that would diﬀer had we
considered these two groups separately. We thus keep this distinction in mind and discuss
these diﬀerences accordingly.
3.1.1 Subjective-Well Being
Each respondent provides information on his own subjective well-being by choosing one
of ﬁve possible categories, from “least satisﬁed” (category 1) to “most satisﬁed” (category
5). We employ primarily two distinct subjective well-being measures, life happiness and
job satisfaction, which present some signiﬁcant diﬀerences.14 First, the correlation between
the two is only 27 percent. As Figure 1 suggests, the distribution of life happiness is more
spread out and more skewed to the left than that of job satisfaction. Since the literature
has utilized a wide variety of subjective well-being measures, the availability of these two
variables allows us to test the robustness of our results. For brevity, the empirical analysis
below highlights our ﬁndings utilizing life happiness as the dependent variable. However,
our results are robust to the use of job satisfaction as an alternative proxy for subjective
well-being.15
14At the beginning of the questionnaire workers are ﬁrst told “from now on, we would like to ask about
your general happiness,” and are asked to report whether they agree with the statement “I’m very happy!”
in general. Later in the questionnaire, workers are asked to report about their satisfaction with respect to
all aspects of their job.
15The literature has investigated potential “fatigue” and “question-order eﬀects” that may arise in survey
responses (McFarland 1981; Schuman and Presser 1996). Although the number of experimental studies on
these issues remains small, the general consensus is that order eﬀects are not pervasive in a typical attitude
survey and that, although in some cases these eﬀects may be important, it is diﬃcult to determine a priori
93.1.2 Workers’ Own Wages
The survey also requests that workers mark down their own wage level from a list of 9
categories, where category 1 denotes annual wages of under 2 million yen and category 9
corresponds to an annual income level of over 10 million yen. We measure individual wages
as the mid-point in each of the 7 intermediate categories, and use ad hoc values for the two
extreme categories. Thus, respondents who reported categories 1, 2, ..., 9 as their wage
level, were assigned annual wages of 1.5; 2.5; ...; 12 million yen, respectively. Alternative
choices do not alter the main results. Additionally, we deﬂate this nominal measure using
the Consumer Price Index to obtain real wages with 1990 as the base year.
One salient feature of wages in our sample of union workers in Japan is that individual
characteristics explain an atypically high fraction of the variation in wages. Table 2 shows
standard Mincer regressions for men and women, separately. Wage regressions for the male
subsample that control for age, tenure, education, hours worked, and marital status, obtain
R2 measures of about 70 percent.16 In contrast, similar speciﬁcations for a sample of U.S.
workers would generally yield an R2 of about 30-35 percent. This high coeﬃcient of deter-
mination in the Japanese data may be partly due to the very strict seniority system that
prevails in the Japanese labor market.17 For instance, the correlation between wages and
age for the full sample of Japanese workers is 69 percent. Using a comparable sample of
unionized workers from the Current Population Survey during the same 1990-2004 period,
the corresponding correlation measure for the U.S. is only 21 percent. This high coeﬃcient
of determination in the Japanese sample may play to our advantage as it reduces possi-
ble concerns that wages may depend themselves on happiness, thus minimizing potential
endogeneity issues. We nevertheless address this possibility in Section 4.
3.1.3 Self-Reported vs. Constructed Reference Wages
Survey respondents provide information on self-reported comparison wages by answering
the question, “What do you think is the average wage of corporate employees who are the
same age as you and doing the same job?” Just as in the case of workers’ own wages,
answers to this question are originally chosen from a list of 9 categories, then matched with
individual wage values according to the category mid-points described above. In contrast
with the reference wage measures employed in previous studies, the availability of self-
reported comparison wages allows us to gauge how workers perceive their peers’ wages.
To better understand the diﬀerences between self-reported and constructed wage mea-
what they may be. It has been argued that question-order eﬀects may be avoided if questions on a same
topic are spread out in the survey. This and other measures have been taken by the team of psychologists
that administered our survey. Given the robustness of our results using two distinct measures of subjective
well-being, placed in diﬀerent sections of the survey, we conclude that question ordering is not an issue
within our framework.
16This feature depends only marginally on wages being reported in categories. When we smooth out
wages by adding a disturbance term that is uniformly distributed between each cutoﬀ point, the R2 statistic
decreases by, at most, 5 percentage points.
17When age-related variables are omitted from an otherwise standard Mincer regression that controls
for individual characteristics such as gender, schooling, and marital status, the coeﬃcient of determination
decreases to 30-35 percent.
10sures, we compare our relative wage measure as reported by the worker to some of the most
common reference wage estimates used in other studies. A standard method consists in cal-
culating wage averages by cells or groups deﬁned by a set of given observable characteristics
of workers. We deﬁne cells in three diﬀerent ways: by gender and age; by gender, age, and
education level; and by gender, age, education level, and managerial experience. Following
the literature, we estimate these cell averages from two diﬀerent underlying data sources:
our own dataset, described above, and an external dataset containing wage information of
workers with similar observable characteristics. This second approach is most commonly
employed in the literature and is useful to validate our results. The external data corre-
spond to wages for individuals working in large companies with over 1,000 employees, as
provided by the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) released by the Japanese Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare.18 A third method that is frequently used in relative
utility studies is to estimate Mincer regressions such as the ones showed in Table 2. The
theoretical comparison wage measure corresponds to the ﬁtted wage value of the average
worker. In what follows we use the prediction from a wage regression that controls for
gender, age, education level, and managerial experience—similar to the third cell deﬁned
above. When using Mincer regressions to estimate reference wages researchers need to ﬁnd
appropriate exclusion restrictions, meaning at least one variable that inﬂuences reference
wages but not happiness. Notice that computing cell averages is equivalent to running a
Mincer wage regression where the regressors are fully interacted with each other. In this
case the identiﬁcation hinges on these interactions, which, like the exclusion restrictions,
are assumed to inﬂuence reference wages but not happiness.
The bottom panel of Table 1 displays summary statistics for workers’ own wages and
self-reported reference wages, as well as comparison wages deﬁned according to the various
methods employed in the literature. The table shows that average wages estimated from
the BSWS external database are less than 2 percent higher than self-reported reference
wages but about 10 percent higher than workers’ own wages. We attribute this signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the second case to the inclusion of workers with a general assistant manager
position (kacho in Japanese) in the BSWS data. In contrast, our dataset only includes wage
information for employees in non-supervisory, assistant manager positions. This technical
subtlety evinces how diﬃcult it can be to compare wage averages across diﬀerent datasets,
which may pose challenges to the use of external databases in the construction of reference
wage measures. In addition, self-reported reference wages seem to be signiﬁcantly more
disperse than any of the other measures utilized in the literature. Averaging wages across
workers with similar given characteristics may not reﬂect accurately, for example, how
undervalued a worker feels in the labor market. This is further conﬁrmed in Figure 2, where
we plot the kernel density of various wage measures. Comparing self-reported reference
wages and reference wages constructed from an external data source, for example, illustrates
a potential underlying pessimism among Japanese workers regarding their beliefs of what
their peers earn. If feelings like this are common among workers, studies utilizing such
theoretical constructs would underestimate the eﬀects of comparison wages on workers’
self-reported levels of well-being.
The data also hint at a potential underlying pessimism in workers’ perceptions of their
18The data can be obtained from the following website: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/.
11peers’ wages, as suggested by the 10-percentage point diﬀerence between self-reported ref-
erence wages and workers’ own wages. This is an important point since a worker’s belief of
his peers’ wages may be endogenous, for example, if a relatively happier individual has a
more optimistic view of his own salary relative to his colleagues’. Conversely, a pessimistic
worker may think that he is underpaid with respect to his peers. With panel data, assum-
ing there was enough variation over time in happiness, wages and relative wages, one could
diﬀerence out time-invariant worker characteristics, such as pessimism, and obtain unbiased
estimates of the eﬀect of absolute and relative wages on happiness. As our dataset does not
allow us to track individuals over time, we address this problem by using answers to two
questions in our survey that are likely to capture workers’ pessimistic attitudes along two
diﬀerent dimensions. The ﬁrst question asks whether a worker believes that his colleagues
would help him in times of need; the second question asks the worker if he is satisﬁed about
the possibility of promotion within his company. Controlling for these two eﬀects should
capture the level of inherent pessimism of a given worker. Additionally, we could interact
these proxies for pessimism with perceived reference wages to capture the potential hetero-
geneity in workers’ perceptions due to pessimistic attitudes. As will be discussed in the next
section, these exercises should quell some of the above-mentioned endogeneity concerns.
Having introduced the data, the next section presents the main results. It is important
to remark that, in spite of their virtues, self-reported reference wage measures are not a
panacea and continue to leave some issues unresolved. For instance, by asking workers to
report what they believe that other employees with their same characteristics and in the
same job earn, the survey restricts workers to conﬁne their reference group to individuals
within their same job. Still, on a more regular basis, workers may potentially compare
themselves to relatives, friends, or colleagues doing other jobs. Moreover, the relevant ref-
erence group may not be stable over time. For instance, a recent graduate may compare
himself to other recent graduates; but a person who has been out of school for 10 years may
compare himself to former classmates and colleagues, to supervisees and supervisors, and
even to former selves.19 Nonetheless, we believe that self-reported comparison wage data
are a superior alternative to reference wage measures constructed from Mincer equations or
cell averages. First, as we mention in Section 2, workers’ perceptions of their peers wages
are more closely related to their overall feelings of happiness, which makes this variable a
more suitable candidate for reference income than the theoretical constructs used in previ-
ous studies. Second, as Clark and Senik (2010) have shown, coworkers are the most frequent
group to which workers compare, which should abate concerns about providing an explicit
reference group of coworkers to surveyed individuals. Finally, in stark contrast with the
alternative comparison income measures employed in the literature, self-reported reference
wages do not limit the worker’s reference group to some cell average and do not hinge on
disputable identifying restrictions. Studies that use cell averages and Mincer-based refer-
ence income measures tacitly assume that individuals compute their peers’ wages the way
econometricians do, which, as argued in Section 2, is unlikely. Some of the disadvantages
of these alternative comparison income variables will become more evident when the model
described in equation 1 is re-estimated in Section 5 using these other measures.
19On this and other related issues, see Senik (2009).
124 Results
To empirically test the relative utility hypothesis, we estimate a version of equation 1 that
substitutes our self-reported reference wage measure, ¯ y∗
i, for the standard proxy used in the
literature, ¯ yi.20 As discussed in Section 3.1, there are important diﬀerences between male
and female workers in almost every dimension from wages to hours worked to educational
attainment, which justiﬁes our estimation of equation 1 for men and women separately.
Pooling the male and female subsamples does not have any signiﬁcant qualitative impact
on our ﬁndings. The errors ui are allowed to be correlated within ﬁrms although diﬀerent
clusterings do not aﬀect our conclusions.
The results in Table 3 ﬁnd strong empirical support in favor of the relative utility hy-
pothesis: holding wages constant, individuals tend to report lower levels of satisfaction when
they perceive that their peers’ wages are higher. In particular, if a worker believes that his
peers’ wages have risen by one standard deviation, his happiness level would decrease by 0.10
standard deviations.21 On the other hand, the absolute wage coeﬃcient is consistently posi-
tive and signiﬁcant at conventional levels, which implies that a worker’s reported happiness
increases as his wage goes up. The results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase
in a worker’s own wage would lead to an increase in happiness of 0.13 standard deviations.
This ﬁnding is reminiscent of the conclusion by Alesina et al. (2004) that “money buys hap-
piness.” Given that the impact of absolute wages on subjective well-being is stronger than
that of relative wages, an across-the-board wage hike of, say, 10 percent would be associated
with an overall increase in reported happiness. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by an F-test that
rejects the null hypothesis that the sum of the coeﬃcients on absolute and relative wages is
equal to zero at conventional levels.
The absolute and the relative wage eﬀects are substantially larger for males. A com-
parison between columns 5 and 6 shows that both the absolute and the comparison wage
coeﬃcients are about 35 to 50 percent stronger for men. This implies that women do not
appear to derive as much utility as men do either from their own labor earnings or their
perception of their peers’ wages.22 Nonetheless, in agreement with the literature, women
generally report higher levels of life satisfaction ceteris paribus, as the results for the pooled
sample in column 7 suggest.
Individual worker characteristics explain a signiﬁcant amount of the variation in reported
levels of life satisfaction. For instance, in the case of males, the inclusion of age, educational
attainment, marital status, and dummies for whether the worker has a blue-collar position
and whether it performs any managerial tasks in the company, increases the coeﬃcient of
determination of the regression from 2 to 7 percent.23 The inclusion of these individual
20Section 5 discusses the consequences of estimating equation 1 using a mismeasured version of the “true”
relative wage benchmark used by workers.
21The direction and magnitude of this estimate is consistent with the ﬁndings in Yamada and Sato (2010)
from a hypothetical choice experiment done on Japanese individuals.
22We purposely are cautious in comparing results for men and women as Conti and Pudney (2011) have
shown that survey design might diﬀerentially inﬂuence the way men and women respondent to questions
about happiness.
23Many previous studies control for both age and tenure in subjective well-being regressions. In our case,
we opt to exclude tenure as a regressor because of the high correlation of this variable with age due to the
characteristic seniority tenure system in the Japanese labor force described in Section 3.1.2.
13worker characteristics reduces the absolute wage coeﬃcient by about 22 percent, although
the impact of wages on happiness remains positive and strongly signiﬁcant. Such reduction
in the magnitude of the own wage coeﬃcient is unsurprising given that standard Mincerian
analysis has proven these individual characteristics to be important determinants of wages.
Pessimism seems to be an important individual trait that aﬀects a worker’s sense of well-
being.24 Pessimistic attitudes about the helpfulness of co-workers and about the possibilities
of job promotions have large and signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on life satisfaction. These eﬀects
are of similar magnitude for both men and women. As discussed in Section 3.1, the inclusion
of these two pessimism variables attempts to minimize concerns about wage endogeneity.
Controlling for pessimistic attitudes leads to small decreases (in absolute value) in the
magnitudes of both the own and the comparison wage coeﬃcients. However, in both cases,
the direction and magnitude of each of these eﬀects are preserved. Additionally, these
two pessimism variables by themselves explain an extra 4 percent of the variation in life
satisfaction, which corroborates the relevance of a worker’s individual characteristics in the
determination of subjective well-being.
To verify that the relationship between happiness and both absolute and relative wages
is not spurious, we investigate other channels through which these links may arise. Things
like a company’s wage structure, pay raises, and worker mobility within the establishment
may aﬀect how satisﬁed workers are with the salary they and their co-workers perceive.
For instance, several authors have argued that high average wages within the company
may provide a signal to the worker about his ability to rise within the ﬁrm’s wage lad-
der (Hirschman and Rothschild 1973; Manski 2000; Senik 2004; Clark et al. 2009b). If the
worker believes that he has greater possibilities of increasing his compensation in the future,
the negative impact of higher peers’ wages would decrease in absolute terms. In other words,
omitting average wages in a happiness regression would overestimate the comparison wage
eﬀect. Moreover, greater wage dispersion within the ﬁrm may also have a signiﬁcant impact
both on satisfaction and on the eﬀect of absolute and relative wages on happiness. For
instance, if workers know that there is greater variance in compensation packages oﬀered
by their company, that may inﬂuence how they feel about their relative rank in the wage
spectrum (Brown et al. 2008).
We explore these possibilities by controlling for the logarithm of average wages and the
interquartile range of log wages within the ﬁrm. As expected, higher average wages have
a positive eﬀect on reported levels of life satisfaction—although this eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant only in the case of male workers. In contrast, greater inequality has a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on happiness for women, while it has no eﬀect on men. Using the
pooled sample, neither mean wages nor wage dispersion have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on life satisfaction. In all cases, the inclusion of these variables has no discernible impact on
the own wage and the reference wage coeﬃcients; that is, the relative utility results continue
to hold.
24On a related issue, Stutzer (2004) found that higher income aspirations reduce individuals’ life satisfac-
tion. See also Frey and Stutzer (2010).
144.1 Heterogeneity in Wage Eﬀects
We have now conﬁrmed that the negative correlation between reference wages and subjective
well-being holds even after accounting for a number of individual worker characteristics and
controlling for other factors that may potentially explain away this relationship. In this
section, we now explore in further detail one additional possible mechanism that may link
these two variables.
Perhaps the most logical or straightforward reason that may justify such relationship is
jealousy. In our case, jealous workers experience lower utility levels when they perceive that
their peers earn more than they do.25 Workers who like to compare themselves to other
workers or who care about what their peers earn are likely to be better informed about the
prevalent wage diﬀerentials at any given time. If this is true, workers who make smaller
prediction errors should suﬀer greater disutility from any increases in wages earned by their
peers.
To test this, we ﬁrst calculate a worker’s wage prediction accuracy and then estimate
the impacts of comparison wages on his reported levels of life satisfaction. We deﬁne such
prediction accuracy as the percentage diﬀerence (in levels) between the peer wage reported
by the worker (i.e., his belief) and the wage average within each worker group or cell
identiﬁed by the age of the worker, his gender, and his education level.26 We sort the whole
subsample of male workers by their prediction accuracy, and then group them into four
broad categories, ranging from worst (i.e., 1st quartile of workers) to best (i.e., workers in
the top 5 percent of predictors). Finally, we re-estimate the SWB equations for each of these
groups, including the full set of controls that were accounted for in column 5 of Table 3.
The results appear in Table 4. The estimates corroborate our initial hypothesis that
better predictors are more severely aﬀected by changes in their peers’ wages. Those who
fare worst at predicting the wage of other workers with similar characteristics, do experience
negative disutility from an increase in their peers’ wages, although this eﬀect is smallest
relative to that of other workers who are more accurate in their predictions. The diﬀerences
in these reference wage eﬀects over well-being are large. For instance, workers in the the
top 5 percent according to their prediction accuracy experience a negative impact on life
satisfaction that is 5 times as large as that reported by workers in the bottom 25 percent of
the sample (-0.21 for worst predictors vs. -1.06 for best predictors). Such a large eﬀect for
workers whose reference wage is very close to the predicted one is also additional evidence
that pessimism, which would drive these two wage measures apart, cannot explain our
results.
Moreover, good predictors not only care more about their peers’ wages, but also about
their own. The diﬀerences in these own wage eﬀects are also relatively large: about three
times as large for best predictors compared to worst predictors. Nonetheless, these increases
in the own wage eﬀect as workers’ prediction accuracy improves are not as marked as those
observed for reference wages. One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that better
predictors experience stronger feelings of jealousy, and so increases in their peers’ wages will
25The economics literature has traditionally deﬁned jealousy in a similar way. See for example,
Dupor and Liu (2003).
26Although we continue to focus on the male subsample only, in this calculation we control for gender
because we expect male workers to compare themselves more often to other male, not female, peers.
15outweigh any increase in well-being they may get from a similar rise in their own wage. In
turn, this result may imply that workers who care more about their peers’ and their own
wages will be more likely to be better informed about job oﬀers and the wage structure in
their profession.
As an additional remark, the estimates in Table 4 suggest that one cannot ignore cultural
diﬀerences when comparing reference and own wage eﬀects on well-being across studies that
use diﬀerent samples, especially if the data employed correspond to individuals in diﬀerent
countries. In Section 5.2, we compare our ﬁndings with those in previous literature keeping
this caveat in mind. Before we do that, we corroborate the robustness of our results in the
following section.
4.2 Robustness Checks for Self-reported Reference Wages
For brevity we show our robustness checks for the male sample only. Table 5 shows that our
main results hold when we consider alternative speciﬁcations. For the sake of comparison,
column 1 shows our preferred speciﬁcation from Table 3, which includes individual charac-
teristics (not shown), underlying pessimism, and ﬁrm’s average wages and wage dispersion,
with the addition of industry ﬁxed eﬀects. As is shown in column 2, accounting for year
ﬁxed eﬀects leaves our main results unchanged.
In column 3, we address the possibility of endogeneity in both workers’ own wages and
reference wages. First, exploiting the Japanese seniority system, we instrument worker i’s
own wage with the average wage of his coworkers that are of the same age; the average is
calculated using all workers of the same age, working in the same company, but excluding
the wage of worker i.27 This strategy is valid as long as the proposed instrument aﬀects
happiness only through individual i’s own wage. The estimates in column 3 show that the
coeﬃcient on own wage is in absolute value slightly smaller but still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, and the same is true for self-reported reference wage. The own wage coeﬃcient
is still larger than the one on self-reported reference wages, but partly due to the increased
standard errors we cannot reject the two coeﬃcients to be the same. Next, in column 4,
we contemplate that a worker’s reference group might depend on the company the worker
chooses to work for, and unobserved amenities within the company might be correlated with
both wages, reference wages, and happiness. Even though these companies are large28 and
might thus have more than one establishment, company ﬁxed eﬀects should also capture
average neighborhood characteristics. The results show that this is not the case and that
controlling for company ﬁxed eﬀects does not alter the main ﬁndings.
In column 5 we perform a horse-race between self-reported reference wage and the refer-
ence wage from external data (see Section 3.1.3). The coeﬃcient on the external reference
wage has the right sign and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but, most importantly, the
coeﬃcient on the self-reported reference wages is practically unchanged. One possibility for
27If we assume that the wage of individual i working in company j is given by: yij =





28We observe approximately 90,000 workers and 62 ﬁrms, which means that each company has on average
1,500 workers.
16the negative sign on the external reference wage is that it proxies for the worker’s perma-
nent wages. The diﬀerence between the own wage and the external reference wage will thus
proxy for unexpected positive shocks to income.29
In column 6, we use an ordered probit instead of the OLS. The coeﬃcients are not directly
comparable with the OLS ones but the relative size of the coeﬃcient on wages and the one
on reference wages can be compared and the interpretation remains the same.30 This result
is in agreement with ﬁndings by Luttmer (2005) that the use of least-squares estimators in
happiness studies does not impact negatively the general conclusions, even when ordered
probit or logit models would be methodologically preferred given the hierarchical and non-
linear nature of the dependent variable.
Finally, column 7 shows that using job satisfaction as our subjective well-being measure
does not alter the main ﬁndings: the coeﬃcient on absolute wages, although slightly smaller
in magnitude, is positive, strongly signiﬁcant, and greater in absolute terms than the ref-
erence wage coeﬃcient. As expected, the latter estimate is negative and signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level. Taken together, these alternative speciﬁcations corroborate the stability of
the results emphasized throughout the section.
5 Testing the Relative Utility Hypothesis Using
Constructed Reference Wages
In the previous section, we used reference wages reported by workers to demonstrate how
robust is the negative relationship between these self-reported reference wages and well-
being. However, self-reported reference wages are not always available. Instead, most
tests of the relative utility hypothesis found in the literature generally rely on reference
wage measures constructed as some average wage deﬁned in various ways, as discussed
in Sections 2 and 3. In this section, we investigate whether these alternate wage measures
deviate from the comparison wage benchmark truly perceived by workers, and if so, whether
these diﬀerences introduce any signiﬁcant biases in the estimated impacts of reference wages
on well-being.
To preview our results, the ﬁndings below show that, in general, the estimated eﬀect
of reference wages on well-being is not consistent when using constructed reference wages
as proxies for the truly perceived comparison wage. Although the theory suggests that
the direction of the bias introduced cannot be determined, our empirical estimates show
slightly smaller reference wage eﬀects when we deﬁne this comparison wage variable using
diﬀerent types of cell averages. However, when reference wages are constructed from Mincer
regressions, the estimated eﬀects are vastly diﬀerent from those suggested by all of our
previous estimates, and highly unstable. We attribute these signiﬁcant discrepancies to the
diﬃculty in ﬁnding valid exclusion restrictions to justify the Mincer approach.
29We thank Angus Deaton for pointing out this possibility.
30Nevertheless, the coeﬃcients turn out to be similar in magnitude to the OLS case partly because the
root mean squared error of the baseline regression is 1.04 and thus close to unity, to which the error term
in the latent model of the ordered probit is normalized.
175.1 Revisiting the Subjective Well-Being Regressions
To investigate how the use of constructed reference wage measures may aﬀect the empirical
tests of the relative utility hypothesis, we ﬁrst re-estimate the regressions in Table 3, now
substituting the self-reported reference wage variable with the alternate measures used in
the literature. The estimates are shown in Table 6. The ﬁrst regression uses self-reported
reference wages and produces estimates similar to the ones shown earlier in Table 3. The
coeﬃcients in columns 2-4 are derived from speciﬁcations that construct reference wages
using various cell deﬁnitions. Cell 1 is deﬁned by the age and education level of the worker
and the average is computed using our own wage data. Cells 2 and 3 are both deﬁned by
the age of the worker, his educational attainment, and whether he is responsible for any
managerial tasks within his company. The diﬀerence between these two averages is that cell
average 2 is also computed from our own wage data, while cell average 3 uses the external
BSWS wage database described in Section 3. Finally, the reference wage in column 5 comes
from a standard Mincer regression similar to the ones shown in Table 2.
The results suggest that life satisfaction regressions that use constructed reference wages
instead of self-reported ones do produce somewhat diﬀerent results. The top panel illustrates
how the raw eﬀects of own and reference wages change when using alternate comparison
wage measures, and so these ﬁrst ﬁve speciﬁcations do not control for individual worker
characteristics. In the case of speciﬁcations that use cell averages, both the own wage and
the reference wage eﬀects are always about 20-30 percent smaller in absolute value relative
to the benchmark estimates. However, although the diﬀerences between each of the own
wage and reference wage coeﬃcients in columns 2-4 and the analogous estimates in column 1
are statistically signiﬁcant, all of these coeﬃcients are important in a statistical sense and
the suggested directions of these eﬀects are preserved. By contrast, the speciﬁcation that
uses Mincer-constructed reference wages tells a diﬀerent story. Although the estimated own
wage eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, as before, the coeﬃcient is 85 percent
smaller than the one derived from a speciﬁcation that uses self-reported reference wages.
Moreover, the estimated impact of reference wages on life satisfaction is more than twice
the size of the corresponding coeﬃcient in column 1, and positive, which contrasts with the
suggested eﬀects in all of the previous speciﬁcations.
These ﬁndings are echoed in the bottom panel of the table, where we re-estimate the
same ﬁve equations, this time controlling for worker individual characteristics. As shown in
Table 3, the inclusion of these regressors slightly lowers the magnitude of both the own wage
and the reference wage coeﬃcients, although the general results are preserved. Once again,
the estimates derived from regressions that use constructed reference wages are somewhat
smaller in absolute value than the corresponding benchmark coeﬃcients obtained when
self-reported reference wages are employed instead. Nonetheless, the own wage eﬀect on
life satisfaction continues to be positive, the negative impact of reference wages on well-
being persists, and all of the coeﬃcients are strongly signiﬁcant. The stark diﬀerence in the
results is given, once more, by the speciﬁcation with Mincer-constructed reference wages.
This time, the size, direction, and statistical signiﬁcance of the own wage coeﬃcient are
almost identical to those obtained using cell averages. Similar to speciﬁcation 5 in the top
panel that did not control for individual characteristics, the estimated reference wage eﬀect
under the Mincer approach continues to be positive, although the coeﬃcient is statistically
18indistinguishable from zero.
In sum, empirical tests of the relative utility hypothesis that employ reference wage
measures constructed by the econometrician imply reference wage eﬀects on subjective well-
being that deviate somewhat from those estimated when self-reported reference wages are
used. In what follows, we attempt to uncover the reasons behind this bias.
5.2 Estimating the Bias
To better understand the diﬀerences described above, we utilize a generalized version of a the
standard classical measurement error model. Recall that equation 1 gives the relationship
between subjective well-being and the reference wage variable, ¯ yi. Now, suppose that the
reference wage variable employed is a mismeasured version of the worker’s correct perception
of what his peers earn, ¯ y∗
i. That is,
(2) ¯ yi = α0 + β0¯ y
∗
i + ǫi.
This represents a generalization of the classical measurement error model, where α0 = 0 and
β0 = 1. We believe this generalization is appropriate in our case because the data suggest
that reported reference wages diﬀer signiﬁcantly depending on workers’ wage levels. For
instance, people with low wages systematically perceive that their peers earn more than
they do; that is, ¯ y∗
i > ¯ yi for low earners, which would imply that α0 > 0 and β0 < 1. Similar
to the classical measurement error model, we assume that the error term is orthogonal to
the true reference wage, and that the relationship between the latter and the mismeasured
variable is linear.
Substituting equation 2 into equation 1 obtains:
(3) SWBi = α1yi + β1(β0¯ y
∗
i + ǫi) + x
′
iγ + β1α0 + ui.
In such a model, a bias arises as a function of both the variance of the ǫ residuals and the
distance between β0 and 1. To see this, assume for simplicity that subjective well-being
does not depend on worker individual characteristics.31 In this case, the probability limit
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0 + var(ǫ)/var(¯ y∗)
The equation above suggests that, in general, b βols
1 is not a consistent estimator of the true
eﬀect of comparison wages on subjective well-being when constructed reference wages are
used. This statement is true as long as β0 is diﬀerent from β2
0 + var(ǫ)/var(¯ y∗). Moreover,
unless we can accurately determine whether β0 is above or below 1, the direction of the bias
is ambiguous.
31The results below do not hinge on this assumption. Using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem we could
alternatively work with the residuals of a projection onto the space orthogonal to the individual charac-
teristics. Alternatively we can derive the coeﬃcient for ¯ y∗ independently from x if self-reported reference
wages are not dependent on workers’ individual characteristics. The data suggest that this is a reasonable
assumption. For instance, compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 3, and note that the estimated self-reported
reference wage does not change when worker characteristics are introduced.
19Can we use instrumental variables (IV) to consistently estimate b βols
1 ? In the classical
measurement error model, an IV estimator would normally get rid of the bias introduced by
the mismeasurement of the independent variable. By contrast, in the generalized version of
the model, an IV approach does not lead to a consistent estimate of b βols
1 , although it does
allow us to bound the estimated eﬀect. To see this, suppose that there are two independent
proxies of ¯ y∗, proxy a and proxy b. We can then use proxy a as an instrument for proxy b:
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The expression above implies that an IV estimate of β1 would still be biased, although
now this bias depends only on the distance between βb
0 and 1, not on the variance of the ǫ
residuals. Taking the ratio between b βiv
1 and b βols
1 one can see that whenever OLS and IV give
similar results, the signal-to-noise ratio var(¯ y∗)/var(ǫ) will be large. Unfortunately, β0 might
still be diﬀerent from one and bias both estimates. Since workers with low wages tend to
report a reference wage that is higher than their own wage, and vice versa, the regression of
predicted reference wages on self-reported ones shows a positive constant term and a slope
that is smaller than one. The IV estimate will thus tend to be larger, in absolute value,
than the true coeﬃcient.
Table 7 compares the OLS and the IV estimates. The OLS regressions are identical to
the ones that appear in Panel A of Table 6 and are shown to facilitate the comparison with
the IV estimates. The four OLS regressions are exactly the same, except that each uses
a diﬀerent reference wage measure. The analogous results for Panel B are not reproduced
for brevity. The reported IV regressions instrument for the same reference wage measure
employed in the corresponding OLS regression, using a diﬀerent cell wage average deﬁnition
as instrument.32 We focus on estimations that use self-reported and constructed reference
wages since, as discussed above, these coeﬃcients are stable across speciﬁcations. Results
that use reference wages derived from Mincer regressions are explored further in Table 8
below.
The ﬁndings conﬁrm the corresponding eﬀects that own wages and reference wages have
on life satisfaction. In all cases, each of the IV estimates is statistically indistinguishable
from the OLS estimate obtained when self-reported reference wages are employed. Looking
at equation 4, the direct implication of this is that b β0 is close to 1, and that the IV coeﬃcients
do provide a consistent estimate of the eﬀect of reference wages on subjective well-being.
Of course, it is possible that this result may not be generalizable to other similar databases
measuring well-being and wages for diﬀerent populations in other regions or countries. A
generalized result, though, is that the IV procedure gets rid of one of the sources of bias. In
our case, this is shown by the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between each of the IV coeﬃcients and
the OLS regression that employs the corresponding mismeasured (constructed) reference
wage measure. Moreover, with respect to the own wage eﬀects, we observe that the IV
coeﬃcient is always somewhat larger than the corresponding OLS estimate. We attribute
this result to the construction of the reference wage measure used in the OLS regressions as
32The ﬁrst-stage estimations and the results from several underidentiﬁcation and weak-instruments tests
are not reported for brevity. These results conﬁrm the validity of our instruments and are available upon
request.
20some average of the own wage variable. In this case, the inclusion of another variable that
accounts for the mean wage of some subsample of the population that has similar charac-
teristics to the worker’s would most likely absorb some of the eﬀect that would otherwise
be (correctly) attributed to the own wage variable.
5.3 Understanding Mincer-Predicted Reference Wages
Thus far, our ﬁndings have been quite robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and subsamples.
They have also been relatively stable when using alternate deﬁnitions of comparison wages,
except in the case of Mincer-predicted reference wages. In this section, we further investi-
gate this discrepancy and argue that one of the main reasons behind the instability of the
Mincer reference wage eﬀects on subjective well-being is the indiscriminate use of exclusion
restrictions that may not necessarily help accurately identify the reference wage eﬀect. A
proper instrument should be able to predict a reference wage, or deﬁne a reference group
without inﬂuencing life satisfaction.33
Table 8 displays results for various tests of the relative utility hypothesis according to
other papers in the literature that construct reference wages following a Mincer approach.
Each column shows the own wage and the reference wage coeﬃcients we obtain by running
a speciﬁcation as close as possible to the one employed in each of the papers, but using
our own data. We also report the direction and signiﬁcance of the reference wage eﬀect on
well-being that the respective authors obtain in their paper using their own data.
The diﬀerences in the estimated reference wage eﬀects, both across speciﬁcations and
across samples, are striking. First, the coeﬃcients vary signiﬁcantly depending on the spec-
iﬁcation, going from -0.41 to 0.64. Thus, the discrepancies arise not only in the magnitude
of the coeﬃcients, but also in the direction of the estimated eﬀect. Such large variation in
the implied impact of reference wages on well-being is surprising given that the underly-
ing sample is exactly the same and the only thing that changes is the exclusion restriction
assumed to identify the reference wage eﬀect. Second, note how the same (or nearly the
same) speciﬁcation produces very diﬀerent results from those reported in the original papers
for their respective samples. For instance, while Sloane and Williams (2000) ﬁnd a positive
and insigniﬁcant eﬀect of reference wages on well-being when they control for variables such
as hours worked, tenure, marital status, and union management experience in the Mincer
equation, we obtain a negative and very signiﬁcant coeﬃcient using the same speciﬁcation
for our sample.
We believe that what gives rise to such disparate results is the indiscriminate use of
diﬀerent exclusion restrictions and the unjustiﬁed categorization of variables as belonging in
either the Mincer or the well-being equation. As noted earlier, the fact that our ﬁndings are
quite robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations, including those that use various constructed reference
wages, suggests that something not inherently related to the estimation of the subjective
well-being equation may be driving the Mincer results. Under the Mincer framework, it is
up to the econometrician to decide whether a given variable belongs in one or the other
equation. For example, some of the authors that follow the Mincer approach have used
33A recent paper by Card et al. (2012) does this in a clever way by using randomized manipulation of
access to information on peers’ wages.
21diﬀerent combinations of variables including age, education, and marital status in their
exclusion equations, even when these variables have shown to be both economically and
statistically relevant in the subjective well-being equation.
Of course, it is also possible that the discrepancies outlined above are due to other rea-
sons. For instance, diﬀerent papers use diﬀerent samples. It is possible that the estimated
reference wage eﬀects on well-being are stronger or weaker, depending on the working pop-
ulation. It is also entirely possible that the “tunnel eﬀects” described in Section 2 are more
prevalent in other populations. Moreover, note that, for the sake of comparison, we are
restricting our estimations to the same sample of male workers with which we have worked
throughout the paper. Other papers in the literature have pooled males and females and
used individuals that diﬀer in their characteristics from our sample of unionized workers
employed by large, publicly-listed ﬁrms in Japan. Nonetheless, estimations using diﬀerent
working subsamples (not reported for brevity) produce results that are, in some cases, sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from the ones reported for each of the speciﬁcations in the table, which
further underlines the instability of the Mincer estimates.
Summing up, the results above suggest that the use of constructed reference wages in
empirical tests of the utility hypothesis produces inconsistent estimates of the eﬀects of
comparison wages on subjective well-being. Our theoretical framework demonstrates that,
in the presence of several mismeasured proxies of the reference wage that is truly perceived
by the worker, an instrumental variables approach may help bound the comparison wage
estimate, although it does not eliminate the bias entirely. An evaluation of the various
empirical constructs that the literature has previously used shows that various cell wage
averages, computed both within our own dataset and from an external wage data source,
perform best in the estimation of the reference wage eﬀects compared to the self-reported
reference wage measure. However, the use of Mincer-predicted reference wages obtains refer-
ence wage eﬀects that are unstable due to multicollinearity that ad hoc exclusion restrictions
typically do not solve. It is thus advised that these Mincer-predicted reference wages are
employed with care.
6 Conclusions
The results in this article ﬁnd strong support for the relative utility hypothesis. Using data
on self-reported reference wages, we observe that individuals report lower levels of both life
and job satisfaction when they perceive that their co-workers earn higher salaries. We ﬁnd
that the association between absolute wage eﬀects and subjective well-being is economically
stronger than that between the latter and comparison wages. Moreover, our results demon-
strate that standard methods employed in the literature to estimate reference income yield
inconsistent estimators of the reference income eﬀect. In particular, we show that linear
predictions of benchmark wage measures obtained by Mincer estimations perform poorly.
This is mainly due to weak identifying assumptions of the comparison wage eﬀect and a
strong multicollinearity problem between predicted wages and the rest of the individual
worker characteristics. In contrast, cell averages based on age, gender, and education levels
and estimated using external datasets generate more reliable results.
We believe that the ﬁndings in this paper can be extended in three main directions.
22First, having acknowledged the existence of important heterogeneous relative utility eﬀects
among workers, it would be relevant to better understand the source of such heterogeneity.
If, for example, better informed individuals tend to exhibit stronger feelings of jealousy and a
stronger negative correlation between their peers’ wages and their own happiness, employers
may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to enhance the secrecy of its workers’ pay information to preserve
aggregate utility within the ﬁrm. Second, the disutility that workers experience from higher
wages among their peers may translate into more tangible outcomes than mere answers in a
survey. For instance, potential feelings of jealousy may impact worker behavior in the form
of reduced teamwork and, hence, lower levels of productivity at the workplace. Alternatively,
aﬀected workers may change job search intensity, as suggested by Card et al. (2012). Third,
it is plausible that workers experience loss aversion in the sense of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). Understanding workers’ asymmetric responses to variations in their peers’ wages
may improve the design of wage setting policies and pay incentive schemes.
From a practical point of view, our ﬁndings strengthen the case to increase resources
that improve the quality of surveys and data collection on job satisfaction and life happi-
ness. Relative wage eﬀects have obvious consequences in redistributive policies, both within
a ﬁrm in the form of salary increases, as within a country in the shape of tax considerations.
Through a better understanding of these potential externalities on workers, ﬁrms and gov-
ernments will be able to ameliorate the design of welfare-enhancing pay schedules and ﬁscal
programs.
References
Abel, A. B. (1990): “Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching Up with the
Joneses,” American Economic Review, 80, 38–42.
Akay, A., O. Bargain, and K. F. Zimmermann (2012): “Relative Concerns of Rural-
to-Urban Migrants in China,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81, 421–
441.
Alesina, A., R. Di Tella, and R. MacCulloch (2004): “Inequality and Happiness:
are Europeans and Americans Diﬀerent?” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2009–2042.
Bakshi, G. S. and Z. Chen (1996): “The Spirit of Capitalism and Stock-Market Prices,”
American Economic Review, 86, 133–57.
Boskin, M. J. and E. Sheshinski (1978): “Optimal Redistributive Taxation when In-
dividual Welfare Depends upon Relative Income,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
92, 589–601.
Brown, G. D. A., J. Gardner, A. J. Oswald, and J. Qian (2008): “Does Wage
Rank Aﬀect Employees’ Well-being?” Industrial Relations, 47, 355–389.
Campbell, J. Y. and J. Cochrane (1999): “Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based
Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 107,
205–251.
23Cappelli, P. and P. D. Sherer (1988): “Satisfaction, Market Wages, & Labor Relations:
An Airline Study,” Industrial Relations, 27, 56–73.
Card, D., A. Mas, E. Moretti, and E. Saez (2012): “Inequality at Work: The Eﬀect
of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction,” American Economic Review, Forthcoming.
Clark, A. E., P. Frijters, and M. A. Shields (2008): “Relative Income, Happiness,
and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 46, 95–144.
Clark, A. E., N. Kristensen, and Westerg˚ ard-Nielsen (2009a): “Economic Satis-
faction and Income Rank in Small Neighbourhoods,” Journal of the European Economic
Association, 7, 519–527.
Clark, A. E., N. Kristensen, and N. Westerg˚ ard-Nielsen (2009b): “Job Satis-
faction and Co-worker Wages: Status or Signal?” Economic Journal, 119, 430–447.
Clark, A. E. and A. J. Oswald (1996): “Satisfaction and Comparison Income,” Journal
of Public Economics, 61, 359–381.
Clark, A. E. and C. Senik (2010): “Who Compares to Whom? The Anatomy of Income
Comparisons in Europe,” Economic Journal, 120, 573–594.
Cole, H. L., G. J. Mailath, and A. Postlewaite (1992): “Social Norms, Savings
Behavior, and Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 1092–1125.
Conti, G. and S. Pudney (2011): “Survey Design and the Analysis of Satisfaction,” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 1087–1093.
Corneo, G. and O. Jeanne (1997): “Conspicuous Consumption, Snobbism and Con-
formism,” Journal of Public Economics, 66, 55–71.
de la Garza, A., A. Sannabe, and K. Yamada (2008): “Job Satisfaction and Happi-
ness: New Evidence from Japanese Union Workers,” Tech. Rep. 08-10, Osaka University.
Duesenberry, J. S. (1949): Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior, Har-
vard University Press.
Dupor, B. and W. Liu (2003): “Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption,” American
Economic Review, 93, 423–428.
Easterlin, R. A. (2001): “Income and Happiness: Towards an Uniﬁed Theory,” Economic
Journal, 111, 465–84.
Ferrer-i Carbonell, A. (2005): “Income and Well-being: an Empirical Analysis of the
Comparison Income Eﬀect,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 997–1019.
Frank, R. H. (1985): Choosing the Right Pond, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
24——— (2005): “Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses,”
American Economic Review, 95, 137–141.
Frey, B. S. and A. Stutzer (2010): “Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual
Subjective Well-Being,” Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel Working
papers 1424, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
Gal´ ı, J. (1994): “Keeping Up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio
Choice, and Asset Prices,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26, 1–8.
Hirschman, A. O. and M. Rothschild (1973): “The Changing Tolerance for Income
Inequality in the Course of Economic Development; with a Mathematical Appendix,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 544–66.
Kahneman, D. and A. B. Krueger (2006): “Developments in the Measurement of
Subjective Well-Being,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 3–24.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk,” Econometrica, 263–291.
Knight, J., L. Song, and R. Gunatilaka (2009): “Subjective well-being and its de-
terminants in rural China,” China Economic Review, 20, 635–649.
L´ evy-Garboua, L. and C. Montmarquette (2004): “Reported Job Satisfaction:
What Does it Mean?” The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33, 135–151.
Loewenstein, G., T. O’Donoghue, and M. Rabin (2003): “Projection Bias In Pre-
dicting Future Utility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1209–1248.
Luttmer, E. F. P. (2005): “Neighbors as Negatives: Relative Earnings and Well-Being,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 963–1002.
Manski, C. F. (1993): “Identiﬁcation of Endogenous Social Eﬀects: The Reﬂection Prob-
lem,” Review of Economic Studies, 60, 531–42.
——— (2000): “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions,” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 14, 115–136.
McBride, M. (2001): “Relative-income Eﬀects on Subjective Well-Being in the Cross-
section,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 45, 251–278.
McFarland, S. (1981): “Eﬀects of Question Order on Survey Responses,” Public Opinion
Quarterly, 45, 208.
Oswald, A. J. (1983): “Altruism, jealousy and the theory of optimal non-linear taxation,”
Journal of Public Economics, 20, 77–87.
Rizzo, J. A. and R. J. Zeckhauser (2003): “Reference Incomes, Loss Aversion, and
Physician Behavior,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 909–922.
25Schuman, H. and S. Presser (1996): Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys,
SAGE.
Senik, C. (2004): “When Information Dominates Comparison: Learning from Russian
Subjective Panel Data,” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2099–2123.
——— (2009): “Direct Evidence on Income Comparisons and Their Welfare Eﬀects,” Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72, 408–424.
Sloane, P. J. and H. Williams (2000): “Job Satisfaction, Comparison Earnings, and
Gender,” LABOUR, 14, 473–502.
Stevenson, B. and J. Wolfers (2008): “Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being:
Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 39, 1–102.
Stutzer, A. (2004): “The role of income aspirations in individual happiness,” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 54, 89–109.
Yamada, K. (2008): “Macroeconomic Implications of Conspicuous Consumption: A Som-
bartian Dynamic Model,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 322–337.
Yamada, K. and M. Sato (2010): “Another Avenue for Anatomy of Income Comparisons:
Evidence from Hypothetical Choice Experiments,” ISER Discussion Paper 0795, Institute
of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
26Table 1: Summary statisticsa
Whole Working subsamples
sample All Males Females
Worker characteristics
Age (years) 34.926 34.676 35.921 30.153
(9.96) (9.64) (9.58) (8.46)
Tenure (years) 13.870 13.525 14.554 9.786
(10.3) (9.94) (10.11) (8.3)
Middle school [0,1] 0.069 0.044 0.048 0.029
(0.25) (0.2) (0.21) (0.17)
High school [0,1] 0.464 0.474 0.480 0.454
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Technical school [0,1] 0.024 0.025 0.024 0.030
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Some college [0,1] 0.095 0.095 0.042 0.286
(0.29) (0.29) (0.2) (0.45)
College [0,1] 0.270 0.283 0.315 0.167
(0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.37)
Post-graduate [0,1] 0.067 0.067 0.081 0.015
(0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.12)
Married [0,1] 0.581 0.583 0.653 0.329
(0.493) (0.493) (0.476) (0.469)
Blue collar [0,1] 0.341 0.336 0.369 0.219
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.41)
Managerial tasks [0,1] 0.171 0.181 0.225 0.023
(0.38) (0.39) (0.42) (0.15)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) 22.679 23.235 26.404 11.718
(19.83) (20.38) (21.16) (11.34)
Life satisfaction (1=lowest...5=highest) 3.274 3.270 3.202 3.516
(1.1) (1.1) (1.11) (1.04)
Job satisfaction (1=lowest...5=highest) 3.066 3.070 3.085 3.017
(0.93) (0.93) (0.94) (0.91)
Wage datab
Own wages 15.401 15.405 15.508 15.028
(0.42) (0.42) (0.37) (0.37)
Self-reported reference wages 15.486 15.491 15.583 15.155
(0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.38)
Cell wage average from our datac 15.401 15.405 15.508 15.028
(0.35) (0.34) (0.28) (0.25)
Cell wage average from external datac 15.501 15.508 15.612 15.133
(0.35) (0.34) (0.29) (0.23)
Mincer-predicted wagesd 15.406 15.405 15.508 15.028
(0.26) (0.26) (0.16) (0.21)
Observations 91896 78136 61278 16858
aFor each worker characteristic, ﬁrst number corresponds to sample average; second number (in
parentheses) corresponds to standard deviation.
bWage ﬁgures are in 2005 Japanese yen and are reported in logs.
cCells deﬁned as gender × age × education level.
dPredicted wages from a Mincer regression that controls for age, tenure, gender, education level,
managerial task, blue collar, job shock, occupation, industry, hours worked, marital status, and year
ﬁxed eﬀects.
27Table 2: Mincer regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Males Females
Dependent variable: Fixed eﬀects:
Annual income Industry Company Industry Company
+Year +Year +Year +Year
Age in years 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure in years 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Middle school [0,1] -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.08***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Technical school [0,1] -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Some college [0,1] 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
College [0,1] 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Post-graduate [0,1] 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.33***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Other degree [0,1] -0.06 -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.08** -0.12*** -0.11***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) 0.02* 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Married [0,1] 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.01 -0.00 -0.01*
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Managerial tasks [0,1] 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Blue collar [0,1] -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 16858 16858 16858
Adjusted R-squared 0.664 0.723 0.755 0.538 0.598 0.636
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in
logs. High school education dummy excluded from regression.
28Table 3: Testing the relative utility hypothesis using self-reported reference wages
Dependent variable: Males Females All
Life satisfaction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Own wage 0.69*** 0.54*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.26*** 0.40***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
Self-reported reference wage -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.16*** -0.26***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) -0.02 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm’s average wages 0.11* 0.09 -0.03 0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06)
Firm’s wage interquartile range -0.09 -0.19** -0.12*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Pessimism about -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.41*** -0.38***
colleagues’ helpfulness (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Pessimism about -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.15*** -0.21***
future promotions (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female [0,1] 0.43***
(0.02)
Age (years) -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared (/100) 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Married [0,1] 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.61*** 0.43*** 0.56***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Middle school [0,1] 0.08*** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08 0.08**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03)
Technical school [0,1] 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.04 0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Some college [0,1] 0.04* 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.17*** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
College [0,1] 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Post-graduate [0,1] 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04)
Other degree [0,1] 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Managerial tasks [0,1] 0.01 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)
Blue collar [0,1] -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.10*** -0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 16858 78136
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 0.074 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.087 0.117
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.113 0.001
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in
logs. High school education dummy excluded from regression. Except for column (1), all speciﬁcations
account for industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
29Table 4: Eﬀects of own wages and self-reported reference wages on life satisfaction by
accuracy of workers’ prediction of peers’ wages
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life satisfaction Prediction accuracy (quartile)
1 2+3 4 Top 5%
Own wage 0.24*** 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.65***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13)
Self-reported reference wage -0.21*** -0.58*** -0.91*** -1.06***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.32)
Observations 14216 30174 17588 3702
Adjusted R-squared 0.060 0.077 0.088 0.089
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.678 0.260 0.028 0.171
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in
logs. Prediction accuracy deﬁned as the percentage diﬀerence (in levels) between peer reference wage
reported by worker and wage average by cell deﬁned as age × gender × education. All speciﬁcations
control for individual worker characteristics including age, age squared, marital status, education level,
managerial and blue collar dummies, as well as ﬁrm’s average wages, ﬁrm’s wage interquartile range, and
industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
30Table 5: Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
External Ordered
Benchmark Year Own wage IV Company reference probit
Dependent variable: Life satisfaction Job sat.
Own wage 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.25***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Self-reported reference wage -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.25*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Hours worked (monthly overtime) -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Firm’s average wages 0.09 0.13* 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.15*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Firm’s wage interquartile range -0.09 -0.14* -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Pessimism about colleagues’ helpfulness [0,1] -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.38***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pessimism about future promotions [0,1] -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.44***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cell average reference wage -0.14*
(0.07)
Fixed eﬀects Industry Year Industry Company&Year Industry Industry Industry
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.115 0.111 0.040a 0.121
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.000 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures and hours worked reported in logs. All speciﬁcations control for age,
age squared, education level, marital status, manager and blue collar positions. In column 3 Own wage is instrumented by the average wage of his
coworkers that are of the same age; the ﬁrst stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is larger than 200.
aAdjusted R-squared not available; pseudo R-squared reported instead.
3
1Table 6: Testing the relative utility hypothesis using alternate reference wage measures
Panel A. Without individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Reference wage:
Life satisfaction Self-reported Cell average 1 Cell average 2 Cell average 3 Mincer
Own wage 0.67*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.10**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Reference wage -0.39*** -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.26*** 0.85***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.024
Panel B. With individual characteristics
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Own wage 0.54*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Reference wage -0.38*** -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.28*** 0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14)
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.074 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures reported in logs. All speciﬁcations control for
(log) hours worked and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcations in bottom panel additionally account for individual worker characteristics including
age, age squared, marital status, education level, managerial and blue collar dummies. Cell averages 1 and 2 calculated from our own data set and
deﬁned as (age × gender × education) and (age × gender × education × managerial tasks), respectively. Cell average 3 calculated using BSWS
data and deﬁned as (age × gender × education × managerial tasks). Mincer reference wage predicted from a standard regression of own wages on
age and tenure dummies, hours worked, education level, marital status, manager, blue collar, job shock, and occupation dummies, as well as
industry and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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2Table 7: Use of IV estimates when self-reported reference wages are not available
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reference wage:
Dependent variable: Self-reported Cell average 1 Cell average 2 Cell average 3
Life satisfaction OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Own wage 0.67*** 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.48*** 0.57*** 0.52*** 0.53***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.031)
Reference wage -0.39*** -0.22*** -0.34*** -0.20*** -0.35*** -0.26*** -0.28***
(0.025) (0.049) (0.067) (0.052) (0.069) (0.047) (0.061)
Instrumental variable: Cell av. 3 Cell av. 3 Cell av. 1
Observations 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278 61278
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020
** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures reported in logs. Cell averages 1 and 2
calculated from our own data set and deﬁned as (age × gender × education) and (age × gender × education × managerial tasks), respectively. Cell
average 3 calculated using BSWS data and deﬁned as (age × gender × education × managerial tasks). All speciﬁcations control for (log) hours
worked and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
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3Table 8: Impact of diﬀerent exclusion restrictions on own wage and reference wage coeﬃcients
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Life satisfaction Clark & Oswald (1996)a Sloane & Williams (2000)b L´ evy-Garboua & Montmarquette (2004)c Senik (2004)d
Own wage 0.39*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Mincer-predicted reference wage 0.64*** -0.41*** 0.45*** 0.18**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Eﬀect of reference income Negative and Positive and Negative and Positive and
in original paper signiﬁcant insigniﬁcant signiﬁcant signiﬁcant
Exclusion restriction Age categories Hours worked Age Age, Tenure
Tenure, Tenure squared Tenure, Tenure squared Hours worked Education level
Education level Marital status categories Tenure, Tenure squared Marital status categories
Marital status married female Marital status Managerial tasks
Union management married male Managerial tasks Industry and
Firm and year ﬁxed eﬀects Union management Occupation ﬁxed eﬀects occupation ﬁxed eﬀects
Observations 61278 61278 61278 55801
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.06
Own wage + reference wage = 0?
p value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Standard errors clustered by ﬁrm in parentheses. All wage measures reported in logs. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include hours worked, age, age squared, managerial tasks, industry and occupation ﬁxed eﬀects.
b Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include hours worked, age, educational attainments, managerial tasks, company ﬁxed eﬀects, six
subjective variables regarding working conditions.
c Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include age categories, educational attainment, job satisfaction, satisfaction with leisure.
d Additional variables in life satisfaction equation include age categories, marital status, family income.
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4Table A-1: Literature survey
Mincer wage approach
Authors Clark and Oswald (1996) (i) Sloane and Williams (2000) (ii) L´ evy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2004) (iii) Senik (2004) (iv)
Data characteristics U.K. workers U.K. workers Canadian workers Russia
Dependent variable Job satisfaction Income Job satisfaction Income Job satisfaction Income Happiness Income
Own-income eﬀect Positive Positive Positive Positive
Reference income eﬀect Negative Positive Negative (v) Positive
|Ref. income| > |Own income| ? (vi) Yes ∗∗ No No No ∗ ∗ ∗
Hours worked Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No No
Age Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age squared Yes No No No No No No No
Tenure No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Tenure squared No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Marital Status/Children No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes No No No No No Yes
Occupation No Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Job class/ supervisor Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Table and equation number 4(1) A 8(1) 7 1,2(1) A.1 3(3) A.1
Method Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit
(i) Other controls in happiness regression; Renter, Has second job, Temporary contract, Health status. Other controls in Mincer equation; Health dummies, Establishment
size dummies, Accident dummies, When work dummies, Sex mix at work dummies, Organization type dummies, Trade Union recognized, Pension member,Incentive
payment, Union member, Part time, Temporary contract.
(ii) Other controls in happiness regression; Temporary contract, Firm size dummies, Part time, Owner-occupier, Promotion prospects, Frequent overtime, Perceived career,
14 Working condition variables, Manual dummy, Union dummy, Training period, Sex mix at work dummies, Race dummies. Other controls in Mincer equation; Female
married, Male married, Length of training period, Shift work, Merit-related payment, Relevant trade union present, Trade union member, Selectivity, Part time, Temporary
contract, Firm size dummies.
(iii) Other controls in happiness regression; Job related satisfactions, Country of birth, Mother tongue, Satisfaction with leisure, Religion. Other controls in Mincer equation;
Canadian borne, Bilingual, Religion, Satisfaction with health, Satisfaction with leisure, Part time.
(iv) Other controls in happiness regression; Lagged individual income, Household income, Household size, Mother tongue, Believer, Round, Health.
(v) Current wage gap (own income minus reference income) and reference income controlled. The diﬀerence of the estimate of reference income and that of current wage gap
is negative, indicating negative eﬀect of reference income.
(vi) *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
3
5Table A-1: Literature survey (continued)
Cell average income from dataset Cell average income from external source Subjective reference income
Authors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Data characteristics Germany U.K. Denmark U.S. U.K. U.S. U.K. and U.S. U.S. Denmark China 29 countries
Dependent variable (i) H. J.S. J.S. J.S. J.S. H. H. H. H. H. H.
Own-income eﬀect Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive
Reference income eﬀect Negative Negative (ii) Positive Negative (iii) Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative (iv)
|Ref. income| > |Own income|? (v) No ∗∗ N.A. ∗∗ No ∗∗ Yes ∗ Yes ∗∗ Yes ∗∗ N.A. ∗∗ Yes ∗∗ No ∗ ∗ ∗ N.A. ∗ ∗ ∗ N.A.∗ ∗ ∗
Hours worked No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age squared Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
Tenure No No No Yes No No No No No No No
Tenure squared No No No No No No No No No No No
Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital Status/Children Yes Yes Yes No aNo Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Industry No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Job class/ supervisor No No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table and equation number 2 (1) 6A (2) 1 (1) 3 (2) 3 (3) 2 (1) 8 (4-8) 1 (1) 1 (1) 6 (4) 1 (1)
Method (vi) O.P. O.P. O.P. OLS O.P. O.P. O. L. OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Other controls; Year ﬁxed eﬀects, Familiy income, Number of children at home, Number of adults at home, Living together, Family condition,
Social means (familiy income, years of education, number of children at home, and adults at home), Cell average income deﬁned by (education, age, and region).
(2) Brown et al. (2008), Other controls; Employer size, Race, Temporary job, Mean pay, Pay range, Union recognition at the work place, Cell deﬁned by work place.
(3) Clark et al. (2009b), Other controls; Year ﬁxed eﬀects, Health problem, Plant size, Cell average wages deﬁne by plant.
(4) Cappelli and Sherer (1988), Other controls; Layoﬀ, Compare mkt, Compare outside, Compare carrier, Manage info, Union info, Union dues, Participations, Part time, Job
inﬂuence, Change work, Change time.
(5) Clark and Oswald (1996), Other controls; Health dummies, Race dummies.
(6) McBride (2001), Other controls; Consumption habituation norm dummies, Race, Health dummies.
(7) Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2004), Other controls; Year ﬁxed eﬀects, Unemployed, Regional house price index, Household size, Race, Retired, Student, Keeping home.
(8) Luttmer (2005), Other controls; Value of home, Renter, Household size, Population, Non-metropolitan area, Fraction black in PUMA, Religion dummies, Race dummies.
(9) Clark et al. (2009a), Other controls; See neighbors often, Socio-economic groups, Number and ages of children, Years in Grid, Year ﬁxed eﬀects, Health problem.
(10) Knight et al. (2009), Other controls; Net wealth, Health status, Unemployed, Comparison variables, Community variables, Attitude variables, Race dummies.
(11) Senik (2009), Other controls; Family size variables, Owner ship of ﬁrms, Member of communist party.
(i) Abbreviations: J.S.; Job satisfaction, H; Happiness.
(ii) Reference income as “wage rank.”
(iii) Reference income as “market wage.”
(iv) Subjective comparison perceptions towards neighbors, family members, friends, and work colleagues.
(v) N.A. when magnitudes are not comparable. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure 1: Distributions of life happiness and job satisfaction (1=lowest.. 5=highest)




Cell average wages (external source)
Figure 2: Density of (log) wages, self-reported reference wages and
reference wages computed from external sources
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